1) What is Anti-Natalism?
The exceedingly provocative belief that reproduction is either never permitted or is typically not permitted is known as anti-natalism. Some people believe the viewpoint is so repugnant that no discussion of it should take place. Others believe that their strong instinctive disagreement with it suffices to disprove all justifications for anti-natalism. But a distinct literature on anti-natalism appeared in the first twenty years of the twenty-first century. Both for and against anti-natalism, sophisticated arguments have been presented and debated. Philanthropic anti-natalism defences, as opposed to misanthropic defences, which emphasise liking and trusting people, centre on the harm done to those who are brought into existence. For instance, David Benatar’s Asymmetry Argument contends that procreation is bad due to an imbalance between pleasure and pain.
While the absence of pleasure is not bad unless someone is deprived of it, the absence of suffering is desirable even if no one experiences it. It is better not to bring them into existence since no one would be injured by their non-existence since everyone who comes into existence will inevitably incur nontrivial pain. Other philanthropic reasons include the notions that people cannot consent to their creation, that having children requires abusing infants in order to produce fully developed adults, and that having children inevitably implies having victims. On the other hand, misanthropic defences of anti-natalism include reference to the evil that people who are created will do. These include the harms that people cause to the environment, other animals, and other people. Finally, it has also been acknowledged that if we have a responsibility to alleviate extreme poverty wherever possible, then both the rich and the impoverished may also have a responsibility to stop reproducing.
2) Main Thinkers and Arguments of Anti-Natalism:
Benatar’s Asymmetry Argument:
Although we will see later that he has provided a misanthropic argument for anti-natalism, the South African philosopher David Benatar is likely the most significant contemporary proponent of anti-natalism. He is best known for defending a strong philanthropic argument that maintains that it is never permissible to procreate.
Benatar’s book, Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence (2006), serves as his primary defence of philanthropic arguments. He has defended the main points of contention in this book against numerous criticisms since its publication and doesn’t seem to have changed his initial conclusions. The main theme of Benatar’s novel, according to him, is that getting born is always a major injury. He is well aware that many people will find this result repugnant due to the strong evolutionary predisposition toward optimism. Finally, Benatar makes it very obvious from the start that his argument applies to all sentient beings because they are all capable of suffering harm, even if he spends the majority of his talk discussing human reproduction.
How did Benatar reach such a debatable conclusion? Take into account the fact that many people believe procreation is often acceptable because most people who are born believe that their lives are worthwhile. In other words, despite encountering a number of challenges and hardships along the way, many of us believe that our lives are worthwhile. Further complicating factors include a personal identification issue brought up by twentieth-century moral philosopher Derek Parfit.
This issue, known as the non-identity dilemma, begs the question of whether or not someone with a very poor quality of life may coherently wish that their life had turned out otherwise. For instance, it is unlikely that Sally would actually be the same person at all, and not some other separate person, Sally*, if she had different parents or under different circumstances. Benatar contends that a single mistake is the cause of all that has happened. He contends that the non-identity problem only occurs because people frequently confuse a life worth continuing with a life worth starting. Benatar claims that these are rarely comparable. This is due to the fact that the former judgement is made by an existing individual about themselves, whereas the latter judgement is made about a potential yet unrealized being. No life is worth beginning, according to Benatar, even though many lives are of continuing after they have begun.
Benatar frequently supports this position by pointing out significant disparities between non-existence and existence. According to Benatar, there is a critical distinction between harms (such as pains) and benefits (such as joys), which implies that life has neither an advantage over nor a disadvantage in comparison to non-existence (Benatar 2006). The lack of pain is beneficial even if no one experiences it, whereas the absence of pleasure is not bad unless someone is deprived of it. This is a crucial distinction that Benatar needs to make in order to support the Asymmetry Argument.
Benatar claims that the first asymmetry he describes is likely the most evident one. This is the imbalance between the argument that there is a strong moral obligation for us not to intentionally cause the suffering of others, but that there is no such obligation for us to purposefully cause the happiness of others (Benatar 2006). The second asymmetry is between the strangeness of expressing the advantages of having a child versus the coherence of citing the disadvantages of having a child (Benatar 2006).
Our retrospective assessments are the subject of the third asymmetry. While we can regret both creating an individual and not creating an individual, we can only truly regret creating a person for the sake of that particular individual. Nothing could be lamented for that person’s sake because they would not have existed if that person hadn’t been created. The fourth asymmetry is between our perceptions of pain in far-off places vs unpopulated areas. Although it is appropriate for us to be sad and regret the former, we shouldn’t be sorry or lament the fact that some far planet (or island on our own planet) is deserted.
The Deluded Gladness Argument:
Benatar provides a second argument, known as the Deluded Gladness Argument, in support of his anti-natalist thesis. The major goal of this argument is to demonstrate that, despite the fact that conventional life appraisals are frequently fairly optimistic, they are virtually always inaccurate. This supports the idea that we shouldn’t have children because all (or nearly all) of our lives are miserable. It also provides evidence in favour of the Asymmetry Argument, which holds that it is forbidden to create someone whose life will do even the slightest amount of harm. The purpose of this argument is to demonstrate that, in the vast majority of situations, the damages contained in human lives are anything but minor. Benatar contends that even the finest lives are terribly bad, and that existence is consequently always a great disservice.
The majority of people have positive opinions on their own lives. In other words, most people do not believe that being brought into life adversely injured them and are happy to have been brought into existence. Benatar’s justifications for believing that such self-evaluations are usually always the outcome of delusion are referred to as the “Deluded Gladness Argument.” According to Benatar, there are a number of well-known characteristics of human psychology that can account for the positive evaluation that people typically give to the value of their own lives. The magnitude of the favourable judgement can be explained by these psychological phenomena rather than by how well one is living (Benatar). The Pollyanna Principle, which states that people have a strong tendency toward optimism in their assessments, is the most significant psychological influence on people.
Positive experiences are remembered more frequently and reliably than negative ones. This means that when people reflect on the past, they frequently exaggerate the good elements while downplaying the bad. People’s perceptions of the future are also impacted by this, with a tendency to overestimate how well things will turn out. Additionally, subjective evaluations of total well-being are frequently exaggerated in terms of positive well-being (Benatar). Just take into account that the majority of people think they are better off than the majority of people or the average person. There is no correlation between subjective and objective judgments of people’s health. The happiness ratings that the poor give themselves are (nearly) always equal to the ratings that the privileged give themselves. Differences in education and employment often result in negligible variations in quality of life assessments (Benatar).
The Hypothetical Consent Argument:
The Hypothetical Consent Argument is arguably the most discussed defence of anti-natalism in the literature after Benatar’s writings. The central claim of the argument is that having children causes an individual unwarranted pain that they were not expecting. But why is reproduction an unwarranted harm? Because there are undoubtedly some circumstances in which injuring a person against their will is acceptable.
The residents of a neighbouring island who are comfortably off but not wealthy are in need of some money, according to an eccentric millionaire ,Gold Manna, who lives on an island. He is unable to interact with the islanders for a variety of reasons, so his only option is to soar in his jet and drop hefty gold cubes among onlookers, each of which is worth $1 million. He is aware that doing so increases the possibility of hurting one or more islanders, a danger he would rather avoid. The only area where he can drop the cubes, however, is extremely congested, increasing the likelihood of serious (but nonlethal and temporary) harm. He continues, reasoning that anyone hurt will still be better off for having made $1 million.
The fact that the benefit imposed does not include preventing a greater harm renders this eccentric millionaire’s acts inadmissible in this situation. Ethicists refer to this as a “pure benefit.” The idea is that while it is unlawful to bestow a benefit on someone who has not given their consent, it is legal to do so on someone in order to shield them from nontrivial harm. There isn’t any actual consent to the injury in the Gold Manna case.
Procreation, according to the anti-natalist, is comparable to the Gold Manna example. The person who is formed with the intention of receiving a pure benefit suffers a nontrivial and unintended harm as a result of reproduction. Therefore, those who would reproduce would not have the potential consent of the people they would produce. How come this is the case? An individual cannot be harmed or profited from if she does not exist. Here, language is unhelpful because there is no such thing as a “person” who does not exist when procreation does not take place. There is nothing, period. No one is on the island, no one is in a burning car, and no free-floating soul is awaiting creation. This argument claims that procreation is always an act of delivering a pure benefit, which is forbidden.
The No Victim Argument:
According to Gerald Harrison, in order to rationally assert the existence of moral obligations, a potential victim must exist (that can be hurt by the breaking of a duty). As a result, he contends that we have a duty not to create the pleasures inherent in any prospective life, but we do not have a duty to produce the misery contained in any prospective life. It makes sense to assume that we have the following two obligations: (1) to stop pain; and (2) to encourage pleasure (Harrison). This effectively explains why we do not have a duty to procreate even if we are confident our progeny would lead very happy lives because there would be no victim if one failed to generate joyful people. This also explains why it is our responsibility to prevent the creation of suffering individuals, as there will undoubtedly be victims (that is, the suffering people who were created).
There is an obligation to never procreate because all lives carry misery. Because there are actual victims of pain, we constantly fail to fulfil our responsibility to prevent suffering when we reproduce. The obligation to refrain from procreation cannot be outweighed by an individual’s total happiness because there is no victim when one abstains from procreation (Harrison).
Harrison contends that two prima facie obligations serve as the foundation for the obligation to refrain from reproduction. First and foremost, we must act to stop harm. Second, we have a responsibility not to materially impair someone without that other’s prior consent. Harrison does admit that performing this duty will mean that no more lives are formed and this is a poor condition of affairs, even if it is not bad for anyone (Harrison). We are not obligated to prevent this situation from occurring because doing so would involve creating beings whose presence will actually be detrimental to themselves.
On the other hand, no one is harmed by the fact that no new lives are generated. Harrison continues, there is nothing nonsensical in his perspective, notwithstanding the unusual idea that a person might be happy for being brought into existence, even when they are hurt by it. For instance, someone might wager a sizable sum in our name without our permission. Even if the wager is successful and we ultimately gain from it, doing so is unethical (Harrison).
Negative Utilitarianism:
The ethical theories of act-utilitarianism and rule-utilitarianism are two prominent consequentialist views. While the latter aims to identify a system of rules that, if followed, will maximise positive impacts, the former concentrates on assessing the acceptability of individual actions based on their consequences. This method involves classifying various action types. A third kind of utilitarianism, known as negative utilitarianism, has been noted to involve anti-natalism. According to this moral theory, the sole important moral principle is to avoid suffering. We should only consider if the consequences of an action will be painful when determining whether it is acceptable (or what set of rules to follow). Simply said, according to this perspective, moral reasoning does not take pleasure (in any sense) into account.
It is preferable to avoid pain by simply choosing not to begin that existence in the first place, as every life contains at least some degree of suffering. Negative utilitarianism holds that since pleasure is ethically worthless, no quantity of pleasure could ever be greater than even the slightest amount of suffering. Although the link between anti-natalism and negative utilitarianism has been established, anti-natalists haven’t exactly been keen to use this as a tactic in their arguments. Negative utilitarianism is not only a contentious moral theory in and of itself, but it also appears to support pro-mortalism, the idea that people should take their own life. After all, doing this seems to be the greatest approach to stop any suffering in the future. Appealing to negative utilitarianism is typically avoided by proponents of anti-natalism because many anti-natalists have gone to considerable pains to demonstrate that the view does not actually necessitate pro-mortalism.
3) Criticisms:
The Benatar Asymmetry Argument has come under fire in a few places. Some have argued that there is no real difference between a life worth starting and a life worth living . Why do we think these two criteria are different? Why not, for instance, maintain that a life that is worth beginning is also a life that is worth living? (DeGrazia) Some have claimed that Benatar does not go far enough to support this distinction, which is crucial for the viability of his case. Another argument has tried to directly refute the asymmetries that Benatar has justified. Benatar claims that the absence of pleasure is not bad unless someone is depriving themselves of it, but perhaps the phrase “not good” is more accurate (Metz). Similarly, perhaps the lack of suffering is best defined as being good (Metz).
The four procreative asymmetries can also be understood in another way. The four asymmetries themselves, according to Benatar, are what can best account for the underlying asymmetries between pain and pleasure. As a result, they do not need to base their argument on an additional asymmetries. If you disagree, DeGrazia offers the answer that we have considerably stronger duties not to hurt than to benefit and that this difference makes all the difference when we add the value of reproductive autonomy. If so, the basic asymmetry between benefit and harm favoured by Benatar is not supported by the asymmetry regarding procreative responsibilities (DeGrazia). There is a conceptual link between goodness and betterness, but if pleasure were essentially good but not better than its absence, there would be no such link, according to Ben Bradley, who claims that Benatar’s asymmetry is invalid.
Benatar’s Asymmetry Argument, according to Elizabeth Harman, “equivocates between impersonal goodness and goodness for a person” (2009). It is true that experiencing pain is undesirable. It is harmful on a personal and an impersonal level. However, since there is no one present to experience it, the lack of suffering can only be nice in an impersonal sense (Harman). Benatar would need to demonstrate that the absence of suffering is equally advantageous to oneself for the asymmetry to hold, though. It is impossible to explore all of the numerous responses to these statements, but it is significant that Benatar has reacted to many of the objections of his reasoning in straightforward fashion.
Benatar has also argued that our lives are much worse than the value at which we typically evaluate them, regardless of the state of his asymmetry thesis. If it turns out that most lives aren’t worth living, then that’s a good enough excuse not to have children. However, a lot of people have argued that Benatar is erroneous regarding this fact. For instance, the fact that so many people are happy to be alive may be sufficient proof that this happiness is genuine (DeGrazia). Any tenable moral theory must also be able to explain why the majority of people are happy to be alive and believe that their lives are going well (DeGrazia). Its inability to discern between lower-order pleasures and small pains is another criticism. The negative effects of being exhausted or hungry are countered by the positive benefits of loving relationships, for example. This can overcome a lot of the unfavourable aspects of existence that Benatar associates with it (Harman).
Self-fulfillment has been vigorously argued by Alan Gewirth as essential to leading a meaningful life. Having a family does not infringe upon the rights of anybody else, despite the fact that particular connections, such as the one between parents and children, contradict egalitarian standards. In spite of the fact that children did not actively choose to create their families, Gewirth argues that “their special concern for their parents and siblings is appropriately viewed as derivative, both morally and psychologically, from the parents’ special concern both for one another and for each of their children and, in this way, for the family as a whole” (1998, 143).
At least for some people, having children and maintaining a family are critical components of self-fulfillment. If Gewirth is correct that self-fulfillment is important and that having children helps with self-fulfillment (at least for some people), then Deluded Gladness should be rejected. Benatar must at the very least take into account Gewirth’s theory of self-fulfillment in addition to the hedonistic theories, desire-fulfillment theories, and objective list theories he critiques for promoting deceptive self-evaluations of life quality.
It’s also crucial to consider whether the kind of self-deception that the Undeluded Gladness Argument appears to demand is indeed conceivable. For instance, according to some theories of deceit, the trickster actively and knowingly misleads another agent. However, this makes it challenging to understand how self-deception is even conceivable. Since dishonesty is intentional, the perpetrator would be aware that they are fooling themselves.
It becomes problematic since it’s plausible to believe that many people have simply tricked themselves into believing their lives are better than they actually are. However, based on the self-deception hypothesis previously discussed, we can question if such self-deception is even conceivable. It is definitely worthwhile to give anti-natalism and self-deception connections more thought. As it is, different theories of self-deception may have an impact on various arguments, but this has not been considered in the literature on anti-natalism as a whole.
Christine Overall contends that even if correct, Benatar’s views might be detrimental to women. Thus, the challenge against anti-natalism presented here is moral rather than intellectual. First, Overall contends that there is no obligation to reproduce because women have control over their own reproductive systems (Overall). Second, she disputes the notion that procreation is cost-free, especially in light of the nine-month pregnancy and delivery. Third, she is concerned that if Benatar’s ideas are adopted, there may be an increase in female infanticide and violence against expectant mothers. The question of whether Benatar is adequately aware of the suffering of women and the potential repercussions of his views for them arises in this situation. Is the opposition to natalism fundamentally sexist?
Benatar responds to Overall by asserting that a right to refrain from reproducing only exists in the absence of a moral obligation to do so. This response binds rights and duties together tightly. He also points out that there is no disagreement around the expenses women pay when having children. Instead of whether there are expenses associated with procreation, the issue at hand is whether it is ethical to reproduce. Benatar concludes by stating once more that his arguments relate to morality, which in this situation is different from the law.
Because of this, he maintains that “contraception and abortion should not be legally mandatory even though contraception and early abortion are morally required” (Benatar 2019, 366). Last but not least, Benatar asserts that Overall has not offered concrete proof that anti-natalism will be harmful to women. Turning this criticism on its head, he contends that anti-natalism may benefit women. Because if it were extensively used, there could be less of a predisposition to consider women as being primarily responsible for childbirth and rearing (Benatar 2019). It seems to be an empirical question whether Benatar or Overall are correct about the effects of anti-natalism on women.
Another argument against rejecting broad anti-natalist conclusions is that procreative autonomy is more significant (Robertson 1994). Procreative autonomy is crucial since it frequently underpins one’s identity, self-worth, and sense of purpose in life.
Anti-natalism is also criticised for being associated with pro-mortalism, the idea that people should take their own lives. As was already mentioned, this is possibly one of the reasons why anti-natalists have refrained from connecting their ideas to negative utilitarianism. It appears unlikely that any of the primary defences of anti-natalism also include support for moralism. In Benatar’s writing, he frequently asserts that while some lives aren’t worth living, most of them are. The Hypothetical Consent Argument is comparable. Just as the islander whose arm was broken by the gold manna should not terminate his life, realising that one has experienced the pure benefit of existence does not indicate that one should commit suicide.
This concern is easily avoided by the No Victim Argument because everyone has a responsibility to further their own pleasure. There is a responsibility to enhance one’s happiness since failing to do so results in an actual victim once one is created. Suicide, perhaps, would not perform this function for the majority of people over the majority of their lives. Finally, the exploitation argument sidesteps this criticism as well. According to this line of reasoning, the majority of adult human lives are worthwhile to be lived out; rather, the issue is the exploitation of babies to obtain such lives in the first place. According to Benatar, even if he believes that most people’s lives are not going well, this does not mean that we should all commit suicide. This is so because our interests in living on are usually intertwined. In order for suicide to be acceptable, our lives would have to be significantly worse than death, which is a terrible thing. This won’t happen very often.