1) Realism according to EH Carr:
Carr separated international relations thinkers into two schools in The Twenty Year’s Crisis, which he called the utopians and the realists. Carr dismissed as “utopians” individuals like Norman Angell who thought that a better and more modern international order could be created around the League of Nations, reflecting his own disillusionment with the League. Carr believed that the League was an unattainable ideal that could never accomplish anything useful and that the entire international order established at Versailles was defective. Carr called the conflict between utopianism and realism in world politics a dialectic development. He claimed that since there is no moral component to realism, success is right and failure is wrong in the eyes of realists.
Carr argued that conflict between the economically advantaged “have” powers and the economically underprivileged “have not” powers characterised international politics. According to this economic theory of international relations, “have” powers like the United States, Britain, and France were more likely to refrain from going to war due to their contented status, whereas “have not” powers like Germany, Italy, and Japan were more likely to do so because they stood to gain from going to war. Carr said that the Munich Agreement was a long overdue acknowledgment of shifting power dynamics. Winston Churchill was portrayed by Carr as a mere opportunist who was solely concerned with gaining power for himself in The Twenty Years’ Crisis, in which he was harshly critical of Churchill. Carr helped provide the groundwork for the school of thought on international relations theory today referred to as classical realism. In his historical studies (including the writings of Thucydides and Machiavelli), Carr showed his strong opposition to what he called idealism. Realisticism and idealism are opposed by Carr.
2) Realism according to Waltz:
A structural theory of international relations that comes from the neorealism school is defensive neorealism. The thesis is based on Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics, in which Waltz contends that governments pursue moderate and cautious policies to achieve national security because of the anarchical nature of the international system. On the other hand, aggressive realism makes the assumption that governments want to enhance their might and influence in order to achieve security through hegemony and dominance.
Defensive neorealism claims that offensive neorealism’s advocacy of aggressive expansion disrupts governments’ propensity to uphold the balance of power theory, diminishing the state’s principal goal, which is, according to them, protecting its security. Although neither the reality of interstate conflict nor the existence of incentives for state expansion are denied by defensive realism, it argues that these incentives are episodic rather than pervasive. In order to explain the start of a conflict, defensive neorealism focuses on “structural modifiers,” such as the security dilemma, location, and elite views and perceptions.
3) Realism according to Mogenthau:
In 1946, Morgenthau published Scientific Man versus Power Politics, which cautioned against relying too much on science and technology to address social and political issues. A “pessimistic view of human nature” was offered in the book, with a universal hunger for power and the inevitable emergence of selfishness at its centre. Robert Jervis stated in Scientific Man versus Power Politics that “much of modern Liberalism fails to understand the contingent nature of its own knowledge.” The “Six Principles of Political Realism” section was first added by Morgenthau in the opening chapter of the second edition of Politics Among Nations.
The main signpost of political realism is the concept of interest defined in terms of power, which infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics and thereby makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible. Political realism holds that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. Political realism steers clear of questions about the goals and ideologies of leaders. Political realism stays away from distorting reality to suit the agenda. An effective foreign policy reduces risks and increases advantages. Realists are aware that the interests that ultimately determine foreign policy rely on the political and cultural environment in which decisions are made. It does not provide “interest defined as power” with a final, unchanging definition.
Political realism is conscious of the moral weight that political activity carries. It is also conscious of the conflict between the moral imperative and the conditions for effective political action. According to realism, universal moral principles cannot be applied to the deeds of states in their abstract universal formulation and must be sifted through the specifics of time and place. Political realism rejects equating a nation’s moral goals with the moral norms that govern the cosmos. The statesman inquires, “How does this policy affect the power and interests of the nation?” The political realist upholds the political system’s independence. A pluralistic understanding of human nature is the foundation of political realism.
The political realist must demonstrate how the interests of the country diverge from those of the moral and legal schools of thought. In Politics Among Nations, Morgenthau made the case that deft diplomacy founded on these ideas may result in stability through the maintenance of the right balance of power. In a society of independent states, he claimed, the balance of power and measures aiming at maintaining it are not only inevitable, but a vital stabilising component.
However, Morgenthau observed that in reality, nations “actively engaged in the struggle for power must actually aim not at a balance — that is, equality — of power, but for superiority of power in their own behalf.” Part of the reason is that it can be challenging to determine a country’s relative strength since crucial components of national power, such “the quality of government,” are elusive and regularly fluctuate. Because no nation can predict the extent of its errors, thus all nations must ultimately strive for the greatest amount of strength attainable in the given conditions. Only in this way can they hope to achieve the highest margin of safety corresponding to the maximum number of mistakes they may make (Morgenthau).
4) Thucydides, the father of Realism:
His History of the Peloponnesian War describes the conflict between Sparta and Athens from the fifth century BC to 411 BC. Those who believe Thucydides’ assertions that he used stringent norms of objectivity, evidence-gathering, and cause-and-effect analysis, without reference to divine intervention, as detailed in his work’s preface, have named him the father of “scientific history.”
He has also been referred to as the founder of the school of political realism, which holds that fear and self-interest are ultimately what drive people’s political actions and the outcomes of interstate relations that follow. In universities and military academies all across the world, his work is still being studied. Political theorists, historians, and students of the classics all extensively study the Melian discourse, which is recognised as a foundational text of international relations theory. In a broader sense, Thucydides created a theory of human nature to explain how people behave in situations like civil war, mass killings, and epidemics.
5) Criticisms of Realism:
Despite not being a uniform group, realists tend to agree on five fundamental aspects of international affairs. The reasons for war and the prerequisites for peace are seen as their primary concerns. They also believe that many features of international interactions can be explained by the framework of the international system, even if it isn’t always sufficient. According to classical realists, the key aspect of the existing system that contributes to the “security quagmire” is the absence of a centralised authority to settle disputes. States that pursue their own security (self-help interest) leave their adversaries insecure, which can be a strong driver of arms races and other hostile interactions. Consequently, the issue of relative talents becomes important (Krasner 1978).
Realists are also unified by their emphasis on geographic positions as the key player in international affairs. City states or empires were the dominant entity prior to the Westphalian treaties. Realists also hold that government behaviour is rational and that this belief is supported by the logic of the concept of “national interest,” which is characterised by survival, security, dominance, and comparative advantage. Although state objectives may vary depending on particular circumstances, the commonality of motives across nations enables the analyst to reassemble the justification for decision-makers’ pursuit of state interests.
Finally, realists consider the state to be a unitary actor. Instead of responding to internal pressures, state acts are thought to be a response to external forces. The nature of the international system defines the external forces. This indicates that a state can be viewed as an independent actor pursuing objectives related to power and the larger interests of society (Hans 1973). Over the past few decades, realism has dominated the field of international affairs. This is because it appeared to offer a crucial framework for comprehending how the post-World War I order collapsed in the wake of a string of European and Far Eastern aggression, World War II, and the Cold War. But this notion has come under intense critical examination. Although the theory’s detractors acknowledge the fundamental elements of realism, they find that this theory lacks sufficient definition and rigour in at least four important areas.
The foundation of realism is a pessimistic explanation of human nature, whether it be a Christian or secular one. Realistically speaking, egoism and self-interest are fundamental to homo politicus and not only the conduct of a select few bad or misguided leaders. Human nature is constant, so it is insufficient to explain all aspects of international relations. What, for instance, would account for peace and collaboration if human nature is the cause of war and conflict? Modern realists have changed their focus from human nature to the context of the international system for states activities explanation in order to avoid this conflict (Krasner 1978).
Additionally, realists’ use of terms like “power,” “national interest,” and “balance of power” has drawn criticism for its imprecision and inconsistencies. There are also obvious potential inconsistencies between the essential descriptive and prescriptive elements of realism. States and their leaders, on the other hand, behave in accordance with interests and a definition of authority. But on the other side, people are urged to use restraint and wisdom and to respect the legal rights of other nations.
Realists emphasise the importance of power, yet the relationship between power dynamics and political outcomes is weak, necessitating the inclusion of additional factors in the study of global systems. Modern realists have turned to appropriate models, analogies, metaphors, and insights as a result of the lack of such clarity. They frequently choose economics, where they adopt a variety of tools and tenets like bargaining theory, rational choice, anticipated utility, theories of firms and marketing, among other things (Snidal 1985).