Object Petit A

1) Object Petit A:

Object petit a, according to Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory, refers to the object of desire that is out of reach. The “a” in this phrase stands for the small other, also known as autre, which is the opposite of the vast Other and refers to otherness itself. Because it is the force that creates want for a certain thing, it is frequently referred to as the object cause of desire. Lacan insisted on leaving the term untranslated so that it could “obtain the status of an algebraic sign” (Écrits).

The term “objet petit a” refers to the (Kleinian) imaginary part-object, which is an element that is imagined to be detachable from the rest of the body. Lacan first proposes this idea in his 1957 seminar Les formations de l’inconscient. He defines object a with the term agalma (Greek, an ornament) in the Seminar Le Transfert (1960–1961). The objet petit an is the object of desire that we seek in the Other, much as the agalma is a valuable object concealed in a worthless box. The “box” can have many different shapes, but they are all irrelevant since what is “within” the box—the object of desire—is what matters.

Objet petit a is described as the residue left behind by the introduction of the Symbolic in the Real in the seminars L’angoisse (1962–1963) and The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis (1964). This is further developed in Lacan’s Four Discourses seminar, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis (1969–1970). One signifier strives to symbolise the subject for all other signifiers in the Master’s discourse, but there is always a surplus that is objet petit a, a surplus of meaning, or a surplus of jouissance.

2) Its Application in Psychology:

Lacan stated that when referring to the “fall” of the a, “the diversity of forms taken by that object of the fall ought to be related to the manner in which the subject is apprehended the desire of the Other.” The earliest form is “something that is called the breast…this breast in its function as object, object a cause of desire.”

The second form, the anal item, then appears. We can infer it from the phenomenology of the gift—the present given while experiencing fear. At the level of the genital act…[where] Freudian theory, and the tradition that has sustained it, situates for us the gaping gulf of castration appears the third form, says Lancan.

The function of petit a at the level of the scopophilic drive was also discovered by Lacan. When the subject is more than anywhere else held captive by the function of desire, its essence is realised. The fifth term of the function of petit a, which will show the range of the object in its – pregenital – relation to the demand of the – post-genital – Other, is the final term, which is related to “the petit a source of the superego.”

The analyst must include the a for the analysand in order for transference to occur: “analysts who are such only insofar as they are object – the object of the analysand.” According to Lacan, it is not sufficient for the analyst to sustain Tiresias’ role. He must also embody or reflect the (missing) object of desire by having breasts, as Apollinaire informs us.

Moving “beyond the function of the a” after working through the transference is necessary for the analysis to eventually be finished. The analyst “has to…be the support of the separating a.” If the analyst becomes this thing while conducting the analysis, he will cease to exist at its conclusion. He will allow himself to be treated like any substitute for that must be thrown away.

3) Object petit a in Films:

Although there are many other theorists who can be named in this context besides Zizek, his prominence and the fact that his work incorporates all of these revived theoretical elements give rise to the assertion that Zizekian film theory can also be used to explain neo-Lacanian film theory.

The primary motif that distinguishes neo-Lacanian (or Zizekian) film theory from conventional film theory is the reconceptualization of the filmic gaze. Zizekian theory describes the gaze as the objectivation of the objet petit, i.e., the indication that the viewer is implied in the item he or she sees. Previously, it was thought to represent the perspective of the camera and provide the spectator the appearance of control.

This meant that the gaze had nothing to do with control and instead represented its opposite: a reminder that the audience is limited in what they can see, is involved in how it is perceived, and that the symbolic meaning of the movie contains inherent tensions.

Joan Copjec was the first proponent to offer this interpretation, but Zizek soon followed suit by connecting the gaze as an object petit a to a number of Lacanian ideas. These include a renewed emphasis on the dynamics of objet petit a (the object-cause of desire), the significance of jouissance, the meaning of drive and desire, and the crucial function of imagination. The Lacanian Real and its role in contrast to the Symbolic and the Imaginary are also discussed. It is best to think of the gaze, the objet petit a, and the Real as a trio of motifs that partially modulate, partially overlap, and partially illuminate one another.

The three would all have the same result in that they undermine the Symbolic’s projected illusionary coherence. The latter can be characterised as the filmic fantasy experienced by the audience and can be understood as an attempt to conceal or deny the Symbolic’s inconsistencies, which are symbolised by the gaze. Zizek is quick to point out the parallels between the dynamics of ideology in reality and the dynamics of fantasy in movies.

Film analysis takes on a heuristic role beyond the ivory tower of mere theory if one could see the conflict between the objet petit a (gaze) and fantasy as the fundamental component of ideology in reality. The person therefore becomes a starting point for thinking about ideology. This is where Zizek sees a moral responsibility in his method of theory practise: theory should not be viewed as a means of arriving at an objective truth, but rather as a historically grounded endeavour to alter reality.

When viewed in this light, his plea for theory in general and film theory in particular is to use its analytical tools to consider and even make changes to our socio-political environment. As a result, his philosophy of film shifts from being about film to being about thinking with film. Film is still essential to understanding the fantastical coordinates of daily life