1) About Deborah Avant
Deborah Avant is a prominent scholar in the field of international relations, particularly recognised for her work on the relationship between political authority, military power, and the changing organisation of force. Her research challenges traditional assumptions about the state’s exclusive control over the legitimate use of violence by examining how non-state actors, private organisations, and market mechanisms have become increasingly involved in the provision of security. Through her influential work, Avant explores how shifts in global politics have transformed the ways in which force is organised, regulated, and justified.
Avant is best known for her contribution to the study of private military and security companies (PMSCs) and their growing role in international affairs. Her work examines how these companies operate alongside, and sometimes in place of, traditional state militaries. Rather than viewing the privatisation of security simply as a consequence of state weakness, Avant argues that it represents a broader transformation in the governance of force. The emergence of private actors reflects changes in political authority, economic organisation, and the distribution of decision-making power in global security environments.
A central contribution of Avant’s scholarship is the concept of “the market for force”, which refers to the increasing involvement of market actors in providing military and security services. Traditionally, the use of organised violence has been considered a core function of sovereign states. States have historically maintained standing armies, controlled military operations, and claimed authority over the legitimate use of force. Avant argues, however, that contemporary security arrangements increasingly involve contracts, private providers, and commercial relationships that complicate this traditional understanding of sovereignty.
Avant’s analysis is rooted in the idea that authority over force is not simply determined by legal sovereignty but is shaped by social, political, and institutional relationships. She examines how different actors compete and cooperate to influence how force is used and controlled. States remain important actors, but they increasingly share aspects of security provision with corporations, international organisations, and other non-state entities. This challenges the assumption that military power naturally belongs only to governments.
Her work also contributes to debates about the changing nature of the state in the contemporary international system. Rather than suggesting that privatisation automatically represents the decline of state authority, Avant demonstrates that states often actively participate in creating and regulating markets for force. Governments may outsource certain military functions for strategic, financial, or operational reasons while still attempting to maintain oversight. This creates a more complex relationship between public authority and private capability.
Avant’s approach differs from explanations that view private security companies merely as tools of powerful states or as signs of institutional failure. Instead, she highlights the interaction between political demand, organisational interests, and institutional constraints. Private military actors emerge not only because states lack capacity but also because governments, international organisations, and other clients find value in flexible, specialised, or politically convenient security arrangements.
Another important aspect of Avant’s scholarship is her focus on governance. She argues that the expansion of private force raises important questions about accountability, legitimacy, and control. When military functions are transferred to private companies, traditional systems of democratic oversight and legal responsibility may become more complicated. Understanding the market for force therefore requires examining not only who provides security but also who regulates these providers and determines the acceptable boundaries of violence.
Deborah Avant’s work provides a framework for analysing how the organisation of force has evolved beyond the traditional state-centred model. By introducing the idea of a market for force, she demonstrates that security provision is increasingly shaped by networks of states, corporations, and institutions. Her scholarship provides the foundation for understanding how power, authority, and responsibility are negotiated in a world where the control of violence is no longer confined entirely to governments.
2) The Mechanisms of Control
The concept of the mechanisms of control in Deborah Avant’s analysis of the market for force refers to the ways in which political authorities attempt to regulate, influence, and manage the actors involved in the provision of security. As military and security functions become increasingly distributed among states, private companies, and international organisations, controlling the use of force becomes more complex. Avant argues that the central issue is not simply who possesses military capability, but how different actors establish systems of authority that shape when, where, and how force is exercised.
One important mechanism of control is the relationship between states and private security providers through contractual arrangements. Governments often maintain influence over private military and security companies by defining the terms under which these organisations operate. Contracts specify the tasks to be performed, the resources provided, and the limitations placed on private actors. Through these agreements, states attempt to retain authority while benefiting from the flexibility and expertise offered by commercial providers.
However, contractual control is not always straightforward because private companies possess their own interests and organisational priorities. Unlike state militaries, which are directly embedded within government institutions, private firms operate according to commercial incentives. Their decisions may be influenced by profitability, reputation, competition, and market demand. This creates a situation where control depends not only on formal legal authority but also on negotiation between clients and providers of force.
Regulation represents another significant mechanism through which states and international actors attempt to manage private security organisations. Governments may establish licensing systems, legal frameworks, and oversight institutions to determine who can provide security services and under what conditions. International agreements and industry standards may also contribute to regulating private force. These mechanisms aim to ensure that private actors operate within accepted boundaries and remain accountable for their actions.
Social and reputational forms of control also play an important role in Avant’s analysis. Private security companies depend on maintaining legitimacy among clients, governments, and the broader international community. Allegations of misconduct, excessive violence, or human rights violations can damage a company’s reputation and reduce its ability to secure future contracts. Therefore, public scrutiny, media attention, and expectations from international society can influence corporate behaviour even when direct state control is limited.
Another mechanism of control involves the dependence of private actors on state institutions for access and authority. Private military companies cannot operate independently of political environments because their activities often require government approval, legal recognition, and access to conflict zones. States continue to control essential resources, including diplomatic protection, intelligence networks, military infrastructure, and legal permissions. This dependence allows governments to influence private actors despite the increasing role of market-based security provision.
Avant also highlights that control over force is shaped by networks of actors rather than a single authority. International organisations, domestic governments, corporations, and civil society groups may all participate in establishing expectations about acceptable security practices. These overlapping forms of governance create a system where authority is dispersed across multiple institutions. Control therefore becomes a process of coordination and negotiation rather than a simple command relationship.
The mechanisms of control demonstrate that the emergence of private force does not necessarily mean the disappearance of political authority. Instead, it transforms the ways in which authority is exercised. Control increasingly relies on a combination of contracts, regulations, reputation, institutional dependence, and international norms. Avant’s analysis suggests that understanding modern security governance requires examining the systems that shape the behaviour of diverse force providers rather than focusing only on who possesses weapons or military capacity.
The mechanisms of control reveal the complexity of governing force in a market-based security environment. As more actors become involved in providing military and security services, maintaining accountability requires multiple layers of oversight and coordination. Avant’s argument shows that the central challenge is not merely the privatisation of violence but the development of effective systems capable of ensuring that all providers of force operate within legitimate political and social boundaries.
3) Diffusion of Power
The concept of diffusion of power refers to the way authority, influence, and capacity to shape security outcomes have become increasingly spread across multiple actors rather than remaining concentrated solely within the state. In Deborah Avant’s analysis of the market for force, the rise of private military and security companies demonstrates that states are no longer the only significant actors involved in organising and providing security. Instead, power has become distributed among governments, corporations, international organisations, and other non-state entities that participate in decisions regarding the use of force.
Traditionally, international relations theory has viewed states as the primary holders of military power. Sovereign governments were considered responsible for raising armies, controlling weapons, and determining when force could legitimately be used. Avant’s work complicates this state-centred perspective by showing that military capabilities and security expertise can increasingly exist outside formal government structures. The diffusion of power does not mean that states have lost all authority, but rather that they now operate within a more complex environment where multiple actors possess influence.
One of the main drivers behind this diffusion is the growing ability of private organisations to provide specialised military and security services. Private companies can recruit skilled personnel, develop technical expertise, and deliver operational support in ways that were once primarily associated with national armed forces. These capabilities allow private actors to influence security practices and strategic decisions. Their involvement creates new relationships between governments and non-state providers, altering traditional patterns of military organisation.
The diffusion of power also reflects changes in the global security environment. Contemporary conflicts often involve complex networks of actors rather than clear confrontations between states. Peacekeeping operations, humanitarian interventions, counterterrorism campaigns, and post-conflict reconstruction frequently require cooperation between governments, international bodies, aid organisations, and private contractors. In these settings, power becomes shared among different groups that contribute resources, knowledge, and operational capacity.
Avant’s argument emphasises that the distribution of power is not simply a transfer from states to corporations. Instead, it involves the creation of new forms of interaction between public and private actors. Governments may rely on private companies for certain functions while still maintaining political authority over broader security objectives. Private actors may gain influence through expertise and capability, but their ability to operate often depends on state approval and institutional support. This creates a relationship of mutual dependence rather than complete replacement.
The diffusion of power also raises important questions about accountability and legitimacy. When multiple actors participate in the use of force, identifying responsibility becomes more difficult. In traditional state-based systems, military actions could generally be traced back to governments and their institutions. However, when private companies become involved, responsibility may become divided between contractors, government agencies, and other organisations. This fragmentation can create challenges in ensuring transparency and enforcing standards of conduct.
Furthermore, the diffusion of power changes the way security decisions are made. Political influence may increasingly depend on access to expertise, financial resources, technological capabilities, and organisational networks. Private companies can shape security practices not only through direct participation in military operations but also through their knowledge and specialised services. As a result, power becomes connected to the ability to provide valuable resources rather than simply possessing formal political authority.
The concept also highlights the changing boundaries between public and private spheres. Military force has historically been viewed as a uniquely public responsibility tied to citizenship, sovereignty, and national interest. The involvement of market actors challenges this distinction by introducing commercial motivations into areas traditionally governed by political considerations. This transformation requires a broader understanding of power, where influence emerges from relationships among various actors rather than from state ownership of military institutions alone.
The diffusion of power demonstrates that the organisation of force in the modern world is increasingly decentralised and interconnected. Avant’s analysis shows that security authority is shaped by a network of actors with different forms of influence and capability. Rather than signalling the end of state power, this diffusion represents a transformation in how power is exercised, negotiated, and controlled within contemporary systems of security governance.
4) Variation in Corporate Structure
The concept of variation in corporate structure examines the different organisational forms, strategies, and internal arrangements that exist among private actors operating within the market for force. Deborah Avant argues that private military and security companies should not be viewed as a single, uniform category of organisations. Instead, these companies differ significantly in their ownership structures, areas of expertise, relationships with clients, and methods of operation. These variations influence how companies behave, how they interact with governments, and how effectively they can be regulated.
One important source of variation is the difference between large multinational security corporations and smaller specialised firms. Large companies often possess extensive financial resources, international networks, and the ability to provide a wide range of services across multiple regions. They may offer logistical support, training, intelligence assistance, or complex security operations. Smaller firms, by contrast, may focus on specialised services that rely heavily on particular skills, local knowledge, or niche expertise. This diversity means that private force providers cannot be analysed through a single organisational model.
Corporate ownership structures also shape the behaviour and priorities of private security organisations. Some companies are independent firms created specifically to provide military or security services, while others operate as divisions of larger corporations involved in defence, technology, logistics, or consulting. Ownership influences decision-making processes, accountability structures, and the relationship between commercial interests and security objectives. A company’s organisational background can therefore affect how it approaches contracts, risk management, and operational responsibilities.
Another form of variation exists in the types of services that corporations provide. Some firms specialise in direct security functions, such as protecting personnel, facilities, or infrastructure, while others provide indirect military support, including transportation, maintenance, training, intelligence analysis, and technological assistance. These differences are significant because the political and ethical implications of each activity vary. A company providing logistical support raises different concerns from one involved in armed security operations.
The relationship between corporations and their clients is another factor that creates organisational variation. Some private security companies work primarily for national governments, while others provide services to international organisations, humanitarian agencies, or multinational businesses operating in unstable regions. The expectations and requirements of these different clients influence corporate structures and operational priorities. Companies serving governments may emphasise compliance with military standards, whereas those working with commercial clients may focus more heavily on risk management and protection of economic assets.
Avant’s analysis also highlights how corporate culture and internal governance affect the way private actors exercise force. Companies develop their own procedures, training systems, and professional standards that influence employee behaviour. Unlike state militaries, which are usually shaped by national military traditions and formal chains of command, private organisations may rely more heavily on corporate management practices. This creates variation in how personnel are recruited, trained, supervised, and held accountable.
Competition within the market for force further contributes to differences between companies. Because private security firms operate in a commercial environment, they must compete for contracts and maintain a reputation for effectiveness. Some organisations may attempt to distinguish themselves through professionalism, specialised expertise, or strong ethical standards. Others may prioritise cost efficiency and operational flexibility. Market competition therefore encourages different corporate strategies and produces varied approaches to the provision of security.
The variation in corporate structures demonstrates that the privatisation of force is not a simple process in which all private actors replace traditional military institutions in the same way. Instead, the market for force consists of diverse organisations with different capacities, motivations, and relationships with political authorities. Understanding these differences is essential for analysing how private security companies influence global security arrangements.
Corporate variation reveals that the impact of private force depends heavily on the characteristics of individual organisations. Avant’s work suggests that the consequences of security privatisation cannot be understood by examining the existence of private companies alone; it requires attention to how these companies are structured, what services they provide, and how they interact with the wider political environment. The diversity of corporate forms is therefore central to understanding the complexity of modern security governance.
5) The Functionalist “Why”
The functionalist “why” refers to the reasons why states, organisations, and other actors choose to rely on private providers of force rather than depending exclusively on traditional public military institutions. In Deborah Avant’s analysis of the market for force, the growth of private military and security companies is not viewed as an accidental development or simply a consequence of weakened states. Instead, it is understood as a response to specific practical needs and institutional demands within contemporary security environments. Private actors emerge because they perform functions that governments and organisations find useful.
One major functional explanation for the rise of private force is the demand for greater flexibility. Traditional military institutions are often structured around long-term national defence objectives, which can make them less adaptable to rapidly changing security situations. Private companies can provide personnel, expertise, and logistical support on shorter timelines and for specific missions. This flexibility allows governments and organisations to adjust their security arrangements according to changing circumstances without permanently expanding their own military structures.
Another reason for the use of private security providers is the need for specialised expertise. Modern security operations increasingly require advanced technical knowledge, including intelligence analysis, cybersecurity, logistics management, equipment maintenance, and specialised training. Private companies often develop expertise in particular areas because they operate within competitive markets where technical capability provides an advantage. Governments and organisations may therefore contract private actors to access skills that are difficult or costly to develop internally.
Cost considerations also contribute to the functional appeal of private force. Maintaining large permanent military institutions requires substantial financial investment, including recruitment, training, equipment, and long-term personnel commitments. Contracting private companies can allow governments to access specific capabilities without bearing all of the costs associated with maintaining permanent forces. Although outsourcing does not always reduce expenses, it can provide greater financial flexibility by allowing organisations to purchase services according to immediate needs.
Avant also highlights the political functions that private force can serve. Governments may use private companies because they provide a degree of operational distance from politically sensitive actions. The involvement of contractors can reduce domestic political pressure by limiting the visible expansion of official military deployments. In some circumstances, private providers allow states to pursue security objectives while avoiding some of the political consequences associated with sending national forces abroad.
The use of private actors can also be explained through organisational efficiency. Different institutions possess different capabilities, and private companies may sometimes perform certain tasks more effectively than government agencies. International organisations, humanitarian groups, and corporations operating in unstable environments may lack the capacity to create their own security systems. Private providers allow these organisations to focus on their primary objectives while relying on specialised actors for protection and operational support.
The functionalist perspective does not suggest that private force is automatically beneficial or that market-based security arrangements are always more effective. Instead, it explains why such arrangements become attractive despite the challenges they create. The same characteristics that make private companies useful, such as flexibility and independence, can also create difficulties regarding oversight, accountability, and control. Understanding the functional reasons behind their growth helps explain why states continue to rely on private providers even when concerns about regulation remain.
Furthermore, the functionalist “why” demonstrates that the market for force develops because it satisfies specific demands within international politics. Private military and security companies exist because governments, institutions, and organisations identify practical advantages in outsourcing certain security functions. Their expansion reflects changing requirements in global security rather than simply the replacement of state authority by commercial interests.
The functionalist explanation reveals that private force has expanded because it fulfils particular roles within modern security systems. Avant’s analysis shows that the market for force is shaped by the practical needs of those seeking security, including demands for expertise, flexibility, efficiency, and political convenience. The important question is therefore not only why private actors exist, but how their functions reshape the organisation and governance of force in contemporary international affairs.
6) Future of Legitimate Force
The future of legitimate force concerns how societies will define, regulate, and justify the use of violence as security provision continues to involve a wider range of actors. Deborah Avant’s concept of the market for force raises important questions about whether legitimacy will remain primarily connected to state authority or whether new forms of accountability will emerge for private and non-state providers. As military and security functions become increasingly dispersed, the challenge is not only determining who can use force, but also establishing the political and ethical conditions under which that force is considered acceptable.
Historically, legitimate force has been closely associated with the modern state. Governments have claimed authority over violence because they are expected to represent collective political communities and operate under systems of law and accountability. However, the increasing involvement of private military and security companies challenges this traditional understanding. When corporations participate in security operations, questions arise about whether commercial organisations can possess legitimate authority to use or support the use of force.
Avant’s analysis suggests that the future legitimacy of force will depend less on whether an actor is public or private and more on the systems of governance surrounding that actor. Private companies may gain legitimacy when they operate under effective oversight, legal frameworks, and accepted international standards. Conversely, state actors may also face legitimacy problems when they use force without accountability or public consent. Legitimacy therefore becomes connected to processes of regulation and responsibility rather than simply the identity of the actor involved.
One major challenge for the future of legitimate force is accountability. Traditional military forces operate within established chains of command, national legal systems, and political institutions. Private security organisations often operate through contractual relationships that may involve multiple jurisdictions and overlapping authorities. Ensuring that private actors are held responsible for misconduct requires stronger mechanisms of monitoring, enforcement, and transparency. Without these systems, the expansion of private force may create gaps in accountability.
The future of legitimate force will also depend on the development of international norms. Since private security companies frequently operate across national borders, domestic laws alone may be insufficient to regulate their activities. International agreements, professional standards, and cooperative regulatory frameworks may become increasingly important in determining acceptable practices. These systems can help establish common expectations regarding training, conduct, and responsibility among diverse providers of security.
Technological change will further shape debates about legitimate force. Advances in surveillance, artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, and cyber capabilities are transforming how security operations are conducted. As these technologies become more accessible to private organisations, questions about control and responsibility will become increasingly significant. The ability of non-state actors to acquire advanced security capabilities may further complicate traditional assumptions about who should possess the authority to exercise force.
Another important consideration is the relationship between commercial incentives and political objectives. States traditionally justify the use of force through ideas such as national security, public interest, and collective protection. Private companies, however, operate within market environments where profitability influences decision-making. The future legitimacy of private force will depend on whether commercial motivations can be effectively balanced with broader ethical and political responsibilities. This requires ensuring that security provision serves legitimate goals rather than purely economic interests.
Despite these challenges, Avant’s framework suggests that the involvement of private actors does not necessarily mean the decline of legitimate authority. Instead, it indicates that legitimacy must adapt to a changing security environment. The governance of force may increasingly depend on networks involving states, corporations, international organisations, and civil society groups. These actors will need to develop new methods of cooperation to ensure that the use of force remains accountable and politically acceptable.
The future of legitimate force will be determined by how societies respond to the changing organisation of security. The market for force demonstrates that military power is no longer controlled exclusively through traditional state institutions. As authority becomes more distributed, legitimacy will increasingly depend on effective regulation, transparency, and accountability. Avant’s work highlights that the central issue of the future is not whether force will become private, but whether evolving systems of governance can ensure that all providers of force remain subject to meaningful standards of responsibility.